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Abstract
Conventional wisdom would suggest if a pirated product, which is cheaper than the 
original product, becomes more reliable then the relative demand of the pirated product 
or the rate of piracy will increase when consumers have different willingness to pay.
However, is this always true? We address this question in a framework where the original 
product developer makes costly investment to deter pirate(s) in a given regime of IPR 
protection. We show that the relationship between the rate of piracy and the reliability of 
the pirated product depends on the nature of the pirate as well as on the nature of the 
market competition if the pirate is commercial. Under commercial piracy, when the 
original firm and the pirate compete in quantities, the conventional wisdom holds i.e. the 
more reliable the pirated product, the higher is the rate of piracy. However, the 
relationship is non-monotonic, hence the wisdom does not hold when they compete in 
prices or the pirates are the end-users. 
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21. Introduction
When the consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for a product then a 
pirated product is likely to sell in the market when piracy is accommodated and it is 
cheaper than the original product. Now suppose the quality or the reliability of the pirated
product (which is usually of lower quality than the original product) gets better; does that 
mean that the relative demand of the pirated product or the rate of piracy will increase? 
We ask this question in two different frameworks, namely, in the environment of 
commercial piracy and the end-users piracy. Under commercial piracy, there are one 
original product developer, a commercial pirate and a group of heterogeneous consumers;
and under end-users piracy there are one original product developer and a group of 
heterogeneous consumers who are also the pirates.1
The issue of piracy or copyright violations and intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection is presently receiving a great deal of attention in various economic analyses. 
Copyright violations take place when there is illegal copying or counterfeiting of the 
original product. These products can be digital products (like software, music CDs, 
movie DVDs, video games etc.) or non-digital products i.e. regular items (like cloth, 
shoes, books, bags, medicines etc.).2  In recent years, there is a renewed interest to study 
the implications of piracy, and mostly those of digital goods piracy because of the rapid 
advancement of digital copying technology. Conventional copying or counterfeiting of 
non-digital products (e.g. the fake brands of original goods), was always there in several 
markets and would continue to be there in future as well. But the growth of digital piracy 
is now posing an additional threat. Since digital piracy is a relatively new phenomenon 
compared to the conventional counterfeiting, a lot of recent studies have focused their 
attention on digital piracy. To study the implications of digital piracy, most of these 
studies considered a scenario where the pirates are mainly the end-users (see Conner and 
                                                 
1 So far studies on piracy or illegal copying are broadly divided in two categories in the literature, 
commercial piracy and end-users piracy. Under commercial piracy, a pirate sells the pirated product for 
profit, whereas under end-users piracy, individual user pirates the product for his/her own use.
2 Globally counterfeiting activities have risen to 5-7% of world trade, or about $200 billion to $300 billion 
in lost revenue, according to some estimates for the European Union some years back (see Time Magazine 
2001). We believe that the figure has increased in recent years due to the significant increase in digital 
piracy. 
3Rumelt (1991), Takeyama (1994), Shy and Thisse (1999), Chen and Png (2003), Bae and 
Choi (2006), Belleflame and Picard (2007) among many others).3 Except few studies (see 
Slive and Bernhardt (1998), Banerjee (2003), Poddar (2005), Kiema (2008)) the issue of 
commercial piracy has not been addressed adequately so far in the literature. Even if 
those few studies addressed commercial piracy, the explicit influence of exogenous IPR 
protection on piracy is never incorporated in the models. Recently, a study by Lu and 
Poddar (2012) deals with this issue in a model where there is one original product 
developer (the incumbent) and a commercial pirate (the potential entrant). The original 
product developer makes costly investment to deter the commercial pirate in a given 
regime of IPR protection anticipating the entry of the pirate. The IPR protection can be 
weak or strong and is exogenous to the model. Its impact on the existence (or non-
existence) of piracy and its relationship to the original producer’s optimal deterrence 
effort to limit piracy are discussed in detail in that framework.4
Now it is generally observed that the pirated product may also vary widely in 
terms of quality or reliability as the quality (and hence the price as well) depends largely 
on the heterogeneity of the consumer demand and their willingness to pay for it. Our 
main focus of this paper is to first study whether a more reliable pirated product increases
or decreases the rate of piracy (i.e. the relative demand for the pirated good) in the market.
Conventional wisdom would suggest that more reliable pirated products would mean
higher relative demand of the pirated good or piracy rate when consumers are 
heterogeneous in their willingness to pay. However, we find that the actual relationship 
between the rate of piracy and the reliability of the pirated product is far more 
complicated and it depends on the nature of the pirate as well as on the nature of the 
product market competition if the pirate is commercial and competes with the original 
firm. Namely, under commercial piracy when the original firm and the pirate compete in 
quantities in the product market, the conventional wisdom holds i.e. the more reliable the 
pirated product, the higher is the rate of piracy, thus the relationship is monotonic. 
However, the same wisdom does not hold when they compete in prices. There we find 
                                                 
3 For a good survey on information (digital) goods end-user piracy, see Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006).  
4 It is fairly well documented that different countries have different levels of IPR protections. Usually 
developed nations have stronger IPR laws (and enforcements) than most developing nations.  
4that the relationship is non-monotonic. When the pirated good is of relatively lower 
quality, piracy rate increases with the quality of the pirated good, but it decreases with
quality when the pirated good is of relatively higher quality. Moreover, in the 
intermediate range of quality of the pirated good, the relationship between the rate of 
piracy and the quality of the pirated good also depends on the effectiveness of the IPR 
protections.
We then extend our analysis to the case of end-user piracy as it is also quite 
prevalent in various markets, particularly in the markets for digital products. Here instead 
of assuming any commercial pirate, we assume there are numerous pirates who are 
basically the end-user consumers and the market structure is monopoly with the original 
producer as the only firm. End-users pirate the product for their own benefit only and are
not involved in any profit making commercial activity. The IPR protection and the 
deterrence effort of the original producer now target the end-users. There we find the 
relationship between the rate of piracy and the reliability of the pirated product is again 
non-monotonic and it also depends on the effectiveness of the IPR protections.5
Finally, we make an overall comparison of different scenarios of piracy we 
considered in the analysis. We find that a pirate is most likely to survive under 
commercial piracy and when it competes with the original firm in quantities and least 
likely to survive under end-user piracy. In terms of optimal deterrence effort of the 
copyright holder we find that to deter piracy, the original producer has to give maximum 
effort under quantity competition as opposed to other two situations, while when the 
pirate is accommodated, the original producer gives least effort for deterrence under 
quantity competition and the maximum effort is given under end-user piracy. 
From our analysis, we conclude that it is the nature and the degree of competition 
between the original producer (i.e. the copyright holder) and the pirate(s) play a major 
role for all the outcomes in different scenarios. We used the basic framework of Lu and 
Poddar (2012) to do the analysis.
                                                 
5  An alternative scenario which is also consistent with end-user piracy would be when there is a 
competitive fringe of commercial pirates (i.e. a large number of identical commercial pirates instead of just 
one) but each pirate makes zero profit due to perfect competition among them. This case is non-strategic. 
Although the working for this case would be little different from the end-user piracy case, however, it can 
be easily verified that the final results with regard to rate of piracy and the quality of the pirated good 
largely remain unchanged (working is available upon request).   
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up the 
model of commercial piracy. In section 3, we do our main analysis of commercial piracy 
under both quantity and price competition. In section 4, we do our analysis of end-user
piracy. Section 5 makes overall comparison of outcomes across different piracy scenarios.
Section 6 concludes.       
2. The Model of Commercial Piracy
2.1 The Original Firm and the Pirate
Consider an original firm and a commercial pirate. The pirate has the know-how or 
the technology to copy/counterfeit the original product. We assume the pirate produces 
copies, which are of lower quality than the original. The product quality of the pirated 
good (compared to original) is captured by the parameter q ,  1,0q . In the case of 
digital product, although the pirated copies are almost like original, they do not come 
with any guarantee or supporting services, thus making them inferior compared to the 
original.
We consider a two-period model, where in the first period  1t , the original 
product developer undertakes costly investment in order to deter piracy. It adopts the 
following entry deterring strategy. It tries to deter the pirate by increasing the cost of 
copying, in particular, raising the marginal cost of producing a pirated copy. The 
potential pirate appears in the market of the original product in the second time 
period  2t  . We assume the higher the entry deterring investment made by the original 
product developer in the first period (the higher the deterrence level), the higher would be 
the marginal cost of copying by the pirate. The pirate if survives, competes with the 
original developer in prices or quantities by possibly producing a lower quality. 
We assume at 1t , the cost of investment of the original product developer to 
choose the level of deterrence, x , is given by   2 2oc x x . Thus, if the profit of the 
product developer at 2t  is denoted by 2o  then the net profit of the developer at the 
end of the game is  2 2 2 2o o o oc x x      . When the level of deterrence is x , the 
marginal cost of production for the pirate will be c x , where c  is a parameter  0c
6exogenously given. We would like to interpret c  in the following way: it is the degree or 
the strength of IPR protection in our model. It essentially captures the strength of legal 
protection and enforcement to stop piracy and it is beyond the control of the original firm 
(i.e. the copyright holder). 6  It is generally understood that the government or the 
regulatory authority can influence c .7 In our model, we interpret c as the public effort 
from the government and x as the private effort from the product developer to stop/limit 
piracy. 
In this study, we first focus on what would be the best entry-deterring strategy x
(hence, the optimal entry deterring private investment in response to potential piracy) for 
the original product developer given an enforcement environment of IPR protection (i.e. 
given c). Secondly, we analyze the main focus of our study, namely, the relationship 
between the rate of piracy and the quality/reliability of the pirated product and how it 
depends on the nature of product market competition which can be in prices or in 
quantities.
2.2 Consumers’ Preferences
Consider a continuum of consumers indexed by  0,X  . X measures the taste or 
the consumer’s willingness to pay for the original product. A high value of X  means 
higher valuation for the product and low value of X  means lower valuation for the 
product.  Therefore, one consumer differs from another on the basis of his/her valuation 
or the taste for the particular product. Valuations are uniformly with density 1 
                                                 
6 It needs to be noted here that without proper enforcements, legal protection may not be effective.
7 According to a recent study by Andres (2006) (also see Park and Ginarte (1997)), the strength of IPR 
protection of a country mainly consists of two categories: membership in the international copyright 
treaties and enforcement provisions.
We assumed an additive form between c and the level of deterrence x that is chosen by the original 
firm. The reason is as follows. We view pirate’s copying cost has two components. One is due to original 
producer’s private effort to deter piracy, which may include technological adoption to protect copying; 
and/or it could be private monitoring, identifying and suing the pirate and all of these efforts can be 
reflected in x . The other component is due to the IPR regime i.e. the strength of IPR legislations and 
enforcements which is reflected in c . Both the original firm’s private effort (investment) and the legal 
protection and enforcement of copyright legislations contribute to the deterrence of piracy.
7distributed over the interval  0, .8 Each consumer purchases at most one unit of the 
good. A consumer’s utility function is given as:
if buys original product,
if buys pirated product,
0 if buys none,
o
p
X p
U qX p
 
 


9
where op  and pp are the prices of the original and pirated products respectively.
10
3. Analysis and Main Results: Commercial Piracy
We look for subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-period game and solve the game
using the usual method of backward induction. We start by deriving demands of the 
product developer and the pirate.
3.1 Deriving Demands of the Product Developer and the Pirate
The demand for the original product and for the pirated product, oD  and pD , can be 
derived from the distribution of buyers as follows. 
Recall that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their values towards the 
product. Thus, the marginal consumer, X  who is indifferent between buying the original 
product and the pirated version, is given by PO pqXpX  , or
 
 q
ppX PO


1
. The 
marginal consumer, Y who is indifferent between buying the pirated product and not 
buying any product, is given by
q
pYpqY PP  ;0 Thus, the demand for original 
                                                 
8 So the number of consumers is normalized to one.
9 Note that 0q   will eliminate the pirated product, while 1q  will make the two products identical. In 
our model 1q   is never possible as we have assumed that the pirated good is of lower quality.  Also 
technically,  0,1q is needed so that demands, prices and profits are not indeterminate.
10 The utility representation is borrowed from the standard model of vertical product differentiation in the 
literature (see Shaked and Sutton (1982), Tirole (1988)).
8product is 
 
     1 1 1o o p
X
D dx q p p q

 

        and the demand for pirated 
product is
 
 
   1 1
X
p o p
Y
D dx qp p q q 

    . 
Note that we have implicitly assumed that o pqp p  when we derive the demand 
functions as above. When this assumption does not hold true, the demand for pirated 
product becomes zero while the demand for original producer is  o oD p   . Thus, 
we write the demand functions as the following:
     
 
1 1       if 
                                       otherwise
o p o p
o
o
q p p q qp p
D
p
 
 
       

,                                  (1)
and
   1       if 
0                                      otherwise
o p o p
p
qp p q q qp p
D
    

.                                                 (2)
In the second period, the product market competition can be in prices or in 
quantities. We will analyze both cases in turn.
3.2 Quantity Competition 11
      Using backward induction, one can first obtain equilibrium quantities in the quantity 
competition stage and then work out the choice of optimal level of deterrence by the 
original firm in the first period. Note that the original producer can decide to 
accommodate or deter entry of the pirate completely.
3.2.1 The Entry Accommodation Equilibrium and Entry Deterrence Equilibrium
      Assume both original developer and the pirate have positive demand. Then from (1) 
and (2), one can obtain the following inverse demand functions:
                                                 
11 Counterfeit hotel or restaurant chains in tourist places could be an example of this kind of piracy where 
the competition between the original and the counterfeits are mainly over the number of tourists/visitors, 
resembling a quantity competition. 
9 1o o pp D qD   ,                                                          (3)
 1p o pp q D D    .                                                          (4)
      In the quantity competition stage, the original developer chooses oD to 
maximize    2 , 1o o p o p oD D D qD D    , while the pirate chooses pD to maximize
   , 1p o p o p pD D q D D c x D        . From the first-order conditions for profit 
maximization, we can obtain both firms’ reaction functions:
 1 12o pD qD  ,                  
1 1
2p o
c xD D
q
    
 
.
The equilibrium quantities are then
    
1 2
4o
D c x q
q


   

,                  
    
1 2
4p
D q c x
q q


  

.
Note that only when  2 c x q  , 0pD  . So if the original producer chooses x such 
that such that  2 c x q  , i.e., 2x q c  , then 0pD  . It is also clear that 
if 2c q , there is no need to deter piracy.
      When  2 c x q  , one can then obtain the following equilibrium prices and profits 
for both firms: 
  1 24op c x qq     ,                  
   2
4p
q c x q
p
q
  


,
 
  22 21 24o c x qq     ,                  
 
  221 24p q c xq q    .
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Note that 2 4o  when 2x q c  , which is the same as when the firm chooses a 
deterrence level higher than 2q c  .12 Thus, when the deterrence cost is taken into 
account, 2x q c  is strictly dominated by 2x q c  .
      In stage 1, the original developer chooses the deterrence level x to maximize 
 
  
2 222
2
1 2
2 24o o
x xc x q
q
  

      

. To find the optimal deterrence level x, 
we first find 
  
 2
2 2
4
o
c x qd x
dx q


  
 

 and 
 
2
22
2 1
4
od
dx q


 

. Note that when 
evaluated at x=0, 
  
 2
2 2
0
4
o
c qd
dx q


 
 

. We then distinguish two cases depending 
on whether 2 2od dx  is positive or negative.
     When  24 2q   , 
2
2 0
od
dx
  . Since we also have 0od
dx
  , the profit function is 
strictly increasing in x. The original producer will choose a deterrence level x as big as 
possible subject to the constraint  2 c x q  . Thus, the optimal deterrence level is
* 2x q c  .
      When  24 2q   , 
2
2 0
od
dx
  . The profit function is concave in x. When evaluated 
at 
2
qx c  ,   
4 2
2 4
o q qd c
dx q
   

, which is positive when   
4 2
2 4
q q
c
q
 


 and 
negative when   
4 2
2 4
q q
c
q
 


. Therefore, when   
4 2
2 4
q q
c
q
 


, the optimal 
deterrence level is * 2x q c  , while when   
4 2
2 4
q q
c
q
 


, the optimal deterrence 
                                                 
12 When 2x q c  , the original producer, as a monopolist, will choose 2op   and obtain profits 
of 4 .
11
level is determined by  
  
 2
2 2
0
4
o
c x qd x
dx q


  
  

 and therefore, 
  
 
*
2
2 2
4 2
c q
x
q


 

 
.
We thus have the following proposition characterizing the entry accommodation 
equilibrium and entry deterrence equilibrium.
Define     
4 2
,
2 4
q q
q
q

 
 


.
Proposition 1
(i) When  24 2q   and / 2c q , the original producer’s optimal level of 
deterrence is * 2x q c  . In this case, it deters the pirate and the pirate has 
no demand.
(ii) When  24 2q    and / 2c q ,
(a) when  ,c q  , the original producer’s optimal level of deterrence is
     22 2 4 2x c q q       . In this case, it accommodates the pirate 
and shares the market with the pirate.
(b) When  , 2q c q    , the original producer’s optimal level of 
deterrence is * 2x q c   . In this case, it deters the pirate and the pirate 
has no demand.
(iii) When / 2c q , there is no need to deter the pirate strategically. Piracy is 
blockaded anyway due to exogenous high level of IPR protection.
       The condition  24 2q   in Proposition 1(i) can be interpreted as when the 
consumers’ tastes are not sufficiently diverse, i.e., for any given q,   is not sufficiently 
big (  22 4 q   ). In such a case, the original producer necessarily deters the pirate as 
long as the degree of intellectual property right is not sufficiently high (i.e. / 2c q ). 
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On the contrary, when the consumer taste is sufficiently diverse
(i.e.  22 4 q   ) the original producer deters the pirate only if the degree of 
intellectual property right is relatively high (i.e.  , 2q c q    ). On the other hand, 
deterrence is too costly if the degree of intellectual property right is low (i.e.  ,c q  ), 
there the original producer accommodates. Note that the numerator of  ,q  has to be 
positive, i.e.  4 2 0q q    , for entry accommodation to arise in equilibrium. Since 
 4q q is maximized on the interval [0,1] at q=1 and the maximum is 3, a necessary 
condition for entry accommodation to be optimal is 2 3  . One can also note that as 
long as 2 3  ,  the condition  24 2q    is satisfied for all  0,1q .
3.2.2 Rate of Piracy and Quality of the Pirated Product 
We define the ratio of  p o pD D D  to measure the rate of piracy. Thus the higher 
the ratio, the higher will be the rate of piracy. When  24 2q   and  ,c q  , i.e. 
when the original firm accommodates the pirate, it is straightforward to get 
   
      
4 2 2
4 3 2 2
p
o p
D q q c
D D q q q q c


  

     
. In all the other cases, entry is either 
deterred or blockaded; thus, the rate of piracy is zero. 
When  24 2q   and  ,c q  , simple computation yields
           
       
2 2 22 2 2
2
2 4 4 4 1 2 4 2 8 12 3
.
4 3 2 2
p
o p
q c q q q c q q q qD
q D D q q q q c
  

                     
      (5)
Since  24 2q    and thus 
         22 2 2 24 2 8 12 3 2 2 8 12 3 8 1 2q q q q q q q q q           , the last term in 
the numerator is positive. Therefore, 0p
o p
D
q D D
      
. This result is summarized in the 
following lemma.
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Lemma 1
When firms compete in quantities, the relationship between the rate of piracy and the 
quality of the pirated product is monotonic i.e. the more reliable the pirated product, the 
higher is the rate of piracy.
The intuition for above result is as follows. When a consumer chooses between a pirated 
copy and original copy, she cares about both the reliability/quality and the price 
difference. Since the price difference effect when firms compete in quantities is small 
compared to the reliability effect, and more consumers choose to buy a product as the 
pirated product becomes more reliable, a monotonic relationship between the rate of 
piracy and the quality of the pirated product obtains.
3.3 Price Competition 
As in section 3.2, we first obtain equilibrium prices in the price competition stage and 
then work out the choice of optimal level of deterrence by the original firm in the first 
period. Since this problem has been analyzed in detail by Lu and Poddar (2012), here we 
just summarize the main findings from that paper.
3.3.1 The Entry Accommodation Equilibrium and Entry Deterrence Equilibrium
The entry accommodation equilibrium and entry deterrence equilibrium in the whole 
parameter space of ,c q  and  is characterized by Proposition 1 in Lu and Poddar (2011) 
which we replicate below.
Define
 
          
  
22 2
2
1 16 12 6 8 1 2 4 1 2
,
2 2 8 8
q q q q q q q q q q
q
q q q
  
 
          

  
.
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Proposition 2
(i) When   4 1 2q q q    and / 2c q , the original producer’s optimal 
level of deterrence is    * 22 2x q c q     . In this case, it deters the 
pirate and the pirate has no demand.
(ii) When   4 1 2q q q     and / 2c q ,
 (a) When  ,c q  , the original producer’s optimal level of deterrence is
       22 2 1 4 1 2x c q q q        . In this case, it accommodates the 
pirate and shares the market with the pirate. 
(b) When  , / 2q c q    , the original producer’s optimal level of 
deterrence is    * 22 2x q c q     . In this case, it deters the pirate and the 
pirate has no demand. 
(iii) When / 2c q , there is no need to deter the pirate strategically. Piracy is 
blockaded anyway due to exogenous high level of IPR protection.
       Similar to the case of quantity competition, in Proposition 2(i), the condition 
  4 1 2q q q     can be interpreted as when the consumers’ tastes are not sufficiently 
diverse, i.e., for any given q,   is not sufficiently big (    2 4 1q q q    ). In such a 
case, the original producer necessarily deters the pirate as long as the degree of 
intellectual property right is not sufficiently high (i.e. / 2c q ). 
On the contrary, when the consumer taste is sufficiently diverse
(i.e.   2 4 1q q q    ), the original producer deters the pirate only if the degree of 
intellectual property right is relatively high (i.e.  , / 2q c q     ). On the other hand, 
deterrence is too costly if the degree of intellectual property right is low (i.e.  ,c q  ), 
there the original producer accommodates. Note that    2 4 1q q q   is minimized at 
q=0.465 and the minimum is 2.274 and thus, a necessary condition for entry 
accommodation to be optimal is 2.274  . 
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Furthermore, if the degree of intellectual property right is sufficiently high 
( / 2c q ), deterrence is blockaded.
3.3.2 Rate of Piracy and Quality of the Pirated Product 
As before, we define the ratio of  p o pD D D  to measure the rate of piracy. 
When  ,c q   and   4 1 2q q q    , i.e. when the original firm accommodates 
the pirate, it is straightforward to get              
1 4 2 4 2
3 1 4 2 1 4 2
p
o p
D q q q q q c
D D q q q q q c


     

      
. 
In all the other cases, entry is either deterred or blockaded; thus, the rate of piracy is zero. 
When  ,c q   and   4 1 2q q q    , simple computation yields
        
        
2 22 2 2
2
2 4 4 4 8 8 4 4 4 10 3
3 1 4 2 1 4 2
p
o p
q c q q q q c q qD
q D D q q q q q c
 

                     
.  (6)
As illustrated by numerical examples in Lu and Poddar (2011) (see appendix 1), the 
pattern of the change of the rate of piracy as the quality of pirated products increases is as 
follows: When 0.465q   (i.e. when q is small), the rate of piracy is increasing in q ;
when q is sufficiently large, it is decreasing in q ; when q is intermediate, it is  decreasing 
in q when c is small and increasing in q when c is large. Thus, we have the following.
Lemma 2 (same as Proposition 4 in Lu and Poddar (2012))
When firms compete in prices, the relationship between the rate of piracy and the quality 
of the pirated product is non-monotonic.
The intuition for above result is as follows. When a consumer chooses between a 
pirated copy and original copy, she cares about both the reliability/quality and the price 
difference. When the reliability of the pirated product is far from the original product, 
price competition is less intense and the price difference is large. However, as the pirated 
product becomes more reliable, the price competition between the pirate and the original 
producer becomes more intense; as a result, the price difference becomes smaller. This 
eventually leads to a non-monotonic relationship. When q is small, the price difference
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effect dominates (as the price of the pirated product is low) and a larger fraction of 
consumers choose to buy pirated product as q increases; whereas when q is sufficiently 
large, the reliability/quality effect dominates (as both the pirated good and the original 
product are close in quality) and thus a smaller faction of consumers choose to buy 
pirated product as q increases further. When q is intermediate, which effect dominates
depends on the degree of IPR protection since the price difference effect is larger when c
is big than when c is small. In other words, the price competition is softer (i.e. prices are 
far apart) when c is big than when c is small. Moreover, we can also show the optimal 
level of deterrence also increases in c, which makes the price competition even softer for 
a big c. As a result, the rate of piracy increases in q when c is big while decreases in q
when c is small.
3.4 Comparison between Price and Quantity Competition 
It is useful to point out how the competition in prices or in quantities in the 
product market affects the strategic responses of the original product developer and the 
pirate. To do that we first explore how the accommodation/deterrence possibilities of the 
pirate are affected due to the nature of market competition. Comparing the condition in 
Proposition 1(iia) and the one in Proposition 2(iia), we have the following finding.
Proposition 3
Entry accommodation of the pirate is more likely to be observed under quantity 
competition than under price competition.
Proof: Observing the fact that      24 4 1q q q q      and    , ,q q    . 
The above result reflects the fact that quantity competition is less stiff than price 
competition. When firms compete in quantities, the original developer has less incentive 
to completely deter the pirate.
As for the relationship between the reliability of pirated products and the rate of 
piracy, combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we have our main result.
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Proposition 4
In an environment of commercial piracy, when the original producer and the pirate 
compete in quantities, the relationship between the rate of piracy and the quality of the 
pirated product is monotonic (i.e. the more reliable the pirated product, the higher is the 
rate of piracy); whereas when they compete in prices, the relationship is non-monotonic.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
In a broader sense, the difference in the results on the rate of piracy is also due to the 
very nature of price and quantity competition. For any given level of quality q of the 
pirated product, quantity competition is always less stiff (i.e. softer) than price
competition. Thus a competing firm is less sensitive and hence less reactive in its 
strategic response due to change in q in the case of quantity competition compared to 
price competition. Moreover, the degree of sensitivity and reaction under price 
competition gets more pronounced compared to quantity competition as q becomes 
significantly high (i.e. the products become close). This is reflected in the following way. 
When pirated good is significantly low in quality, rate of piracy is increasing in quality 
for both quantity and price competition i.e. the qualitative behavior in the change of the 
piracy rate across the two types of competition matches. However, when the pirated good 
is significantly high in quality, the intensity of competition under price gets much higher 
than under quantity; hence we get a divergence in the behavior on the piracy rate. In other 
words, the difference in the intensity or the degree of competition over price and quantity 
does not seem to matter much when the pirated good is relatively low in quality, but it 
matters when the pirated good is relatively high in quality. 
4. End-User Piracy
Now we extend our analysis to the case of end-user piracy. End-user piracy is quite 
prevalent, in particular, in the market for digital goods as it is relatively easy to copy a 
digital product.13 Here, we assume there is no commercial pirate in the economy, and the 
consumers (i.e. all potential product users) are the potential pirates. As before, there is 
one original product developer and consumers’ valuations are uniformly distributed over 
                                                 
13 Most common digital products are computer software, music, movies and games. 
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the interval  0,  with density 1  . Consumers have the choice to buy the original 
product from the product developer or they can pirate themselves. The activity of the 
original product firm remains exactly the same as before, except that now it targets the 
end user pirates to stop or limit piracy as opposed to commercial pirate that we have 
analyzed before. However, unlike before, here the original firm does not face any direct 
competition from anybody in the market; instead, it stands to lose its potential market 
because of end user pirates. Under this circumstance to limit/stop piracy, it invests to 
raise the cost of piracy to the end users.14
Thus a consumer’s utility function is given as:
 
       if buys original product
if pirates original product
0       otherwise,
X p
U qX c x

  


where x  is the level of deterrence for piracy from the original producer and 0c   is the 
exogenous cost parameter as before measuring the degree of IPR protection and this time 
it is targeted to stop/limit end-user piracy. 
4.1 Deriving Demand of the Original and Pirated Product
The demand for the original product and for the pirated product, oD  and pD , can be 
derived from the distribution of buyers as follows. 
The marginal consumer, Xˆ , who is indifferent between buying the original product 
and pirating is given by  
q
xcpX


1
ˆ . The marginal consumer,Yˆ , who is indifferent 
between pirating the product and not buying any product is given by 
q
xcY ˆ . Thus,
the demand for the original firm is     ˆ
11
1o X
q p c x
D dx
q
 
 
   
 
 and the demand 
for the pirated product is   
ˆ
ˆ
1
1
X
p
Y
qp c x
D dx
q q 
 
 
 . Here we have implicitly assumed 
                                                 
14 Here, we do not need the two period time structure as before, everything can be formulated within a 
single period without loss of generality. There is no strategic game here; it’s a monopoly analysis.
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qp c x   so that the demand for the pirate product is nonnegative. When instead 
qp c x  , the developer’s demand is o
pD 

 .
4.2 Choice of Optimal Price and Level of Deterrence by the Product 
Developer
When the developer chooses p and x such that qp c x  , the firm’s profit 
maximization problem is 
      
2
0, 0
1 1max
1 2
. .
o o op x
q p c x
pD c x p x
q
s t qp c x


 
    
      
 
,
which is labeled Problem I. 
When the developer chooses p and x such that qp c x  , the firm’s profit 
maximization problem is 
  2
0, 0
1max
2
. .
o o op x
ppD c x p x
s t qp c x

 
      
 
,
which is labeled Problem II.
4.2.1 The Optimum
We summarize the optimum in the following proposition after solving Problems I 
and II (see appendix 2 for all the details).
Define    1 1,
2
q q
q
q

 
 


.
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Proposition 5
(i)  When  ,c q   (this implicitly requires  1 1q q   ), the original developer 
accommodates piracy, the optimal price is 
    
 
* 1 1
2 1 1
q q c
p
q
 

  

 
and the 
optimal level of deterrence is   
* 1
2 1 1
q c
x
q


 

 
.
(ii)  When  ,
2
qq c     , the original developer deters piracy, the optimal price is 
 *
2
1
2
qc
p
q





and the optimal level of deterrence is * 2
2
2
q cx
q




.
(iii) When 
2
qc  , the piracy is blockaded and the original developer’s optimal price 
is the monopoly price *
2
p  .
4.3 Rate of Piracy and Quality of the Pirated Product
As before, we define the ratio of  p o pD D D  to measure the rate of piracy. 
When  1 1q q   and  ,c q  , i.e. when the original firm accommodates the pirate,
it is straightforward to get       
1 2 1
2 1 2 1 1
p
o p
D q q q c
D D q q q c


   

    
. In all the other cases, 
entry is either deterred or blockaded; thus, the rate of piracy is zero. 
When  1 1q q   and  ,c q  , simple computation yields
    
    2
2 1 1 2
2 1 2 1 1
p
o p
c c qD
q D D q q q c


             
.                                (7)
Clearly, when 1
2
q  , the sign of the partial derivative is positive; when 1
2
q  , it is 
positive if c is relatively large, i.e.    2 1 ,q c q      while negative if c is relatively 
small, i.e.  0 2 1c q    . Thus, we have a similar conclusion as in Lemma 2. 
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Proposition 6
The relationship between the rate of piracy and the quality of the pirated product under 
end user piracy is non-monotonic.
        To illustrate this result, we present some numerical examples. Fix 5  . Then the 
condition  1 1q q    is satisfied when 0.2764 0.7236q  .  ,q   is maximized at 
q=0.5168 and the maximum is 0.1676. Thus, a necessary condition for piracy 
accommodation to be optimal is 0.1676c  . When c=0.05, then 
 
 22
11 101 200
2 11 101 100
p
o p
D qd
dq D D q q
  
     
,  which is positive when 0.2764 0.505q   and 
negative when 0.505 0.7236q  . When c=0.1, then  
 22
3 51 100
6 51 50
p
o p
D qd
dq D D q q
  
     
,  
which is positive when 0.2764 0.51q   and negative when 0.51 0.7236q  . When 
c=0.15, then  
 22
13 103 200
2 13 103 100
p
o p
D qd
dq D D q q
  
     
,  which is positive when 
0.2764 0.515q   and negative when 0.515 0.7236q  .
        The intuition for this result is similar to the one for Lemma 2.
4.4 Comparison between End-user piracy and Commercial Piracy under 
Price Competition 
Comparing the condition in Proposition 2(iia) and the one in Proposition 5(i), we
have the following result.
Lemma 3
Entry accommodation of pirates is less likely to be observed under end-user piracy than 
under commercial piracy under price competition. 
Proof: Follows from the fact that      4 1 2 1q q q q q      and    , ,q q    .  
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Under accommodation, the original firm faces more severe competition from the 
end-user pirates compared to the commercial pirate under price competition. Note that 
the cost of piracy to the end-user pirates is )( xc  ; whereas the price of the commercial 
pirate satisfies xcp P   and more often it is more than )( xc  . Thus keeping other 
things constant, the original firm will have a greater incentive to avoid the situation of 
accommodation with end-user pirates compared to the commercial pirate under price 
competition. 
5. Comparison Across all Three Scenarios
5.1 Accommodation/Deterrence Possibilities of the Pirate
Now we consider all the three alternative scenarios (i.e. (i) commercial piracy under 
quantity competition, (ii) commercial piracy under price competition, (iii) end-user piracy
under monopoly) we discussed so far to make an overall comparison of accommodation 
and deterrence possibilities of the pirate(s). 
Given      , , ,q q q       and       24 4 1 2 1q q q q q q        , 
we have a clear ordering on the accommodation/deterrence possibilities of the pirate(s) 
which we summarize below in the following proposition.
Proposition 7
A pirate is most likely to survive under commercial piracy and when it competes with the 
original firm in quantities and least likely to survive under end-user piracy.
This result is also a consequence of the fact that the original firm faces the softest 
competition from the pirate under quantity competition and the toughest competition 
from the end-user pirates.
5.2 Piracy Deterrence Effort by the Copyright holder across three Scenarios
The comparison of the optimal deterrence efforts *x of the original producer to 
stop/limit piracy across the three scenarios can be summarized as follows. Since 0* x
in the blockaded entry case, we exclude it in the following discussion.
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Proposition 8
Under deterrence:  )()()( *** userendxpricexquantityx 
Under accommodation:  )()()( *** quantityxpricexuserendx 
Proof: Follows directly from comparing the relevant expressions we derived before.
To deter under quantity competition, the original firm has to incur higher effort 
level as the pirate is most easily accommodated in this case compared to other two. On 
the other hand, for accommodation, since the competition is most relaxed under quantity, 
deterrence effort is the least for the original firm. To relax the competition under the 
toughest competition which happens under end-user piracy, the original producer has to 
incur maximum level of effort. The intensity of the price competition is between these 
two cases, so is the level of optimal effort of deterrence of the original firm.   
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study whether reliable pirated products lead to higher rate of 
piracy. We address this question in a framework where the original product developer i.e. 
the copyright holder makes costly investment to deter the pirate(s) in a given regime of 
IPR protection. The pirate can be commercial or end-users. The IPR protection can be 
weak or strong and is exogenous to the model. The pirated product may vary widely in 
terms of quality or reliability. In this set-up, we show that the relationship between the 
rate of piracy and the reliability of the pirated product depends very much on the nature 
of the pirate as well as on the nature of the market competition if the pirate is commercial
and competes with the original producer. Under commercial piracy, when the original 
firm and the pirate compete in quantities, the conventional wisdom holds i.e. the more 
reliable the pirated product, the higher is the rate of piracy. However, the relationship is 
non-monotonic, hence the wisdom does not hold when they compete in prices or the 
pirates are the end-users. 
We also find that a pirate is most likely to survive under commercial piracy and 
when it competes with the original firm in quantities and least likely to survive under 
end-user piracy. This result is a consequence of the fact that the original firm faces the 
softest competition from the pirate under quantity competition and the toughest 
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competition from the end-user pirates. The optimal level of deterrence of the original firm 
also reflects that fact.
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Appendix 1
Numerical examples:
q   ,q    p o psign D D D q    
0.5 5 0.345 0  when 0.192c 
0  when 0.192 0.345c 
0.47 5 0.340 0  when 0.021c 
0  when 0.021 0.340c 
0.6 5 0.320 0  when 0.320c 
0.9 10* 0.089 0  when 0.089c 
*Note: When q=0.9,   2 4 1 7.169q q q   .
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Appendix 2
Problem I 
        Now we solve Problem I first. Define Lagrangian 
        
2
1
1 1, ,
1 2
q p c x
L p x p x qp c x
q

 

    
       
. The sufficient and 
necessary conditions for the optimum are the following: 
     
 
1 , , 1 2 0
1
L p x q p c x
q
p q
 


    
  
 
,                        (A1)
 
 
1 , , 0
1
L p x p x
x q




   
 
,                                  (A2)
  0, 0, qp c x qp c x       .                                     (A3)
        If 0  , then we can solve for p and x from (A1) and (A2) after plugging 0 
into these equations and get 
    
 
1 1
2 1 1
q q c
p
q
 

  

 
 and   
1
2 1 1
q c
x
q


 

 
. We also 
need to check whether qp c x   is satisfied and we find that this condition is satisfied 
when  1 1
2
q q
c
q
 


. In this case, the developer’s profit is 
  
  
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2 2 1 1
A
o
q c
q



 

 
,  
where the superscript A indicates this is an accommodation case.
        If instead qp c x  , then we can solve for p and x from (A1), (A2) and qp c x  , 
and get  2
1
2
qc
p
q





, and 2
2
2
q cx
q




. Note that 0x   when 
2
qc  . We also need to 
check whether 0   is satisfied and we find that this condition is satisfied when 
 1 1
2
q q
c
q
 


. In this case, the developer’s profit is   2
2
2 2
D
o
c q c
q
 


 


, where the 
superscript D indicates this is a deterrence case.
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Problem II 
        Next we turn to Problem II. Define Lagrangian 
   22 1, , 2
pL p x p x qp c x 

       
. The sufficient and necessary conditions 
for the optimum are the following: 
 2 , , 2 0L p x p q
p
  

   

,                                     (A4)
 2 , , 0L p x x
x



   

,                                         (A5)
  0, 0, qp c x qp c x       .                                     (A6)
        If 0  , then we can solve for p and x from (A4) and (A5) after plugging 0 
into these equations and get 
2
p   and 0x  . We also need to check whether qp c x 
is satisfied and we find that this condition is satisfied when 
2
qc  . This is clearly the 
blockade case since the condition qp c x   is satisfied when the original developer 
chooses the monopoly price, 
2
p  , and zero deterrence level, x=0. In this case, the 
developer’s profit is 
4
B
o
  , where the superscript B indicates this is a blockade case.
        If instead qp c x  , then we can solve for p and x from (A4), (A5) and qp c x  , 
and get  2
1
2
qc
p
q





, and 2
2
2
q cx
q




. We also need to check whether 0   is 
satisfied and we find that this condition is satisfied when 
2
qc  . This is clearly the 
deterrence case and the developer’s profit is   2
2
2 2
D
o
c q c
q
 


 


.
